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THE TENTH COMMANDMENT AND RESTRICTED DOMAINS OF PREFERENCES
Dy Zvi Ritz
ABSTRACT
The validity of the restricted domains of preferences approach as
a tool in the analysis of social choice problems is discussed. It is
demonstrated that the tenth commandment, viewed as part of a social
behavior code, generates restricted domains of preferences in a manner
that allows the creation of Arrow type social welfare functions and
strategy-proof choice mechanisms for groups of rational and selfish
individuals, when privately owned goods are under consideration.

THE TENTH COMMANDMENT AND RESTRICTED DOMAINS OF PREFERENCES
1. INTRODUCTION
A common assumption in the analysis of social choice problems is
that individuals are represented by their preferences. In some cases
these are assumed to be the reported or the revealed preferences, while
in others they are assumed to be the "true" or "inner" preferences
which are unobservabie.
Arrow (1963), Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwai te (1975) in their
seminal works demonstrated the difficulties underlying any attempt to
aggregate in a "reasonable and just" manner the wills and preferences
of individuals in a group, into a unique group preference or choice.
Arrow proved that it is impossible to construct a social welfare func-
tion which possesses the properties of unanimity, independence of irre-
levant alternatives and no dictator, while Gibbard and Satterthwai te
proved the impossibility of constructing a social choice function which
possesses the property ot unanimity, strategy-proof ness and no dic-
tator, slack's (1948) celebrated example of single-peaked preferences
demonstrated that in societies with certain uniformity in attitudes and
behavior among their members, some of these difficulties can be circum-
vented. Slack's example and the discussion of it in Arrow (1963)
initiated the Restricted Domains of Preferences (RDP) approach in the
investigation of problems in social choice.
In taking the RDP approach researchers assume that the preferences
of the individuals in the group or society at issue, demonstrate some
similarities. Namely, that these preferences are restricted to a cer-
tain class of preferences typical to this particular society. The
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appeal of this approach is two-fold. First it allows the derivation of
positive or possibility results, and secondly it is similar to assump-
tions widely accepted in related topics in economic and game theories.
Arrow (1963, p. 81) posted the following question: "The results...
show that mathematically, at least, it is possible to construct suitable
social welfare functions if we feel entitled to say in advance that the
tastes of individuals fall within certain prescribed realms of simi-
larity. Do these or possible other mathematical restrictions have any
social significance?"
Clearly the validity and usefulness of the RDP approach depends on
the answer to this question. The implicit assumption used any time
this approach is taken, is that there is some factor that causes
similarities among the preferences of members of the same society. It
may be some biological or genetic factor; it may be the informal peer
pressure exerted; or it may be the rules and regulations imposed upon,
or accepted by the members of the society. (The dictionary defines
society as "a part of a community bound together by common interests
and standards".) There is an obvious need for empirical observations
that will substantiate this implicit assumption and will help justify
the RDP approach.
Considering the importance of the question posed by Arrow, it is
surprising that among all the researchers who analyzed and used the RDP
approach (see Kalai and Muller (1977), Maskin (197b), Sen (1979), Ralai
and Ritz (1980), Ritz (1983), Ritz (1985), Blair and Muller (1983),
Muller and Satterthwai te (1983) among others) only Arrow (1963)
addressed it. He discussed the possible relation between the similarity
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in attitudes and wills of individuals in a society, and the doctrine
of the idealist school in the field of political philosophy, as
reflected in the works of Rousseau, Kant and others.
This study should be regarded as part of an effort to identify
aspects of the human experience which can be interpreted, however
remotely, as attempts to deal with those problems which are at the core
of social choice theory through generation of appropriate restricted
domains or preferences.
Prominent among the possible generators of RDP-s are social, ethical
or religious codes, which by definition aim to mold and direct the
behavior patterns and attitudes of individuals so as to follow some
stated standards. Recognizing the role of the Ten Commandments as a
corner stone for the justice and morality concepts of western civiliza-
tion, it was selected as the first code to be studied.
Even a cursory analysis of the Ten Commandments reveals the sur-
prising phenomenon that only one commandment— the last one—deals with
the preferences of the individual. Let me quote (Exodus 20:17):
You shall not covet your neighbor's house; you shall
not covet your neighbor's wife, or his manservant, or
his maidservant, or his ox, or his ass, or anything
that is your neighbor's.
Clearly this commandment aims to govern the "inner" or "true" preferences
of the individual over privately owned properties or goods.
in economic models, when dealing with privately owned or consumed
goods, the prevailing assumption is that individuals behave selfishly.
This assumption finds its expression also in the social choice litera-
ture: in social choice an individual is considered to be selfish if he
is indifferent between any two social states or alternatives in which
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his own situations are equal. Arrow (1963, Th. 3) proves that
restricting the individual preferences to reflect selfishness does not
suffice to remove the difficulties in aggregating the individual pre-
ferences into a group preference (social welfare function). Kalai and
Ritz (198U) and Ritz (1983) refer to cases with the selfishness
restriction as problems with private alternatives.
In this study we derive two main results for societies with private
alternatives. First we demonstrate that it is possible to represent
the tenth commandment as a condition on the individual preferences (the
no covet condition) in a manner that allows the existence of social
welfare functions which possess the properties defined by Arrow (1963),
and social choice functions which possess the properties defined by
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwai te (1975). Then we demonstrate that if
the private alternative sets are extended to include bundles of the
original alternatives, then in order to derive similar results for the
extended problem, the no covet condition must be made a good deal more
stringent. In addition we discuss the economic significance of the
condition, as well as how it reconciles the dilemma of restricting both
the revealed and the "true" preferences of individuals to the same RDP.
In section 2 we introduce the notation and definitions, present the
results, and discuss their significance for the case where the social
alternatives are bundles of single alternatives; in section 3 we dis-
cuss and present the results for the case where the social alternatives
are bundles of sets of alternatives; section 4 is a summary and the
proofs are in section 5.
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2. Single Good Bundles
2 .1 Notations and Definitions
The notations used here follow Ritz (1983).
Consider a finite set N of n individuals (n
_> 2) . For every j in
N, let A be a finite set of indivisible goods (also referred to as
j
alternatives) originally owned by individual j. Every A. contains at
least two elements. Assume that for every two different individuals i
N
and i in N, A A. = 4> , and let A = A. be the set of all the goods
available to the group. A bundle of goods (or a bundle of alternatives )
is a vector X = (x. ,,.,,x ) such that x, ,...,x are elements in A, andIn In
in which alternative x is allocated to the first individual, alter-
native x is allocated to the second individual, etc. Let F be the
set of all the bundles which do not allocate the same good to more than
one individual at a time, namely: F = {xjx. s* x. for i t j}. F is the
set of feasible bundles . Let Z denote the set of all the reflexive,
transitive and complete binary relations on A. Elements of Z are
called preference relations. If for some alternatives, a, b in A and a
preference relation r in E it is arb, it is said that a is preferred to
b in r; if it is botn arb and bra then it is said that a is indifferent
to b in r, denoted by aib; and if it is arb and not bra then a is
strictly preferred to b in r, denoted by apb. Let &., a nonempty sub-
set of £, denote the domain of admissible preferences available to
individual j in N. 0. is referred to as a restricted domain of pre-
J
~—
f erences (Ri)P).
A restricted domain of preferences ft. (for some j in N) is said to
possess the property of No Covet (NC) if for any preference relation
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r in ft
. ,
every alternative a in A., and each alternative b in A but not
in A., a is strictly preferred to b in r—i.e., apb in r.
The WC condition is the representation of the tenth commandment as
a restriction on tne individual's preferences. It states that the indi-
vidual must strictly prefer what is nis to what is not. A profile of
preferences is a vector R = (r,,...,r ) such that r 1 is an element in
1 n 1
Jl , r is an element in Q etc. Let ft =» Q ,...,fl denote the set
of all the admissible profiles of preferences.
Consider two different problems faced by the group. The first is
to order all the bundles in F while taking into consideration the indi-
vidual preferences. Let A denote the set of all reflexive, tran-
sitive and complete binary relations on F. An n-person social welfare
n (n) (n)
function (SWF) over private alternatives is a function h : ft * A
If for a profile R in J] and bundles X, Y in F, it is both Xh (R)Y and
Yh
n (R)X, the X is indifferent to Y in h"(R) — XIY, if it is Xh"(R)Y
but not Yhn (R)X, then X is strictly preferred to Y in h
n (R) — XPY.
An n-person SWF h satisfies unanimity (U) if for every X and Y in
F and R in Q, such that for every k in N, \ riJ^y and for at least
one individual j in N, x py in r., then XPY in h (R), while if for
J J J
everv k in N. x. iv in r, , then XIY in n (R). n satisfies indeDen-} k k k =
dence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if for every X, Y bundles in F
k k k.and R, S profiles in ft such that [for every k in N, x r y,
iff
x s y, and y, r, x, iff y, s, x, J then Xh
n (R)Y iff Xhn (S)Y. A SWF is dic-
k. k k k k k. kkk
tatorial (D) if there exists an individual j in n, such that for every
X and Y bundles in F and every profile R in ft , x.py. in r. implies
XPY in h (R). A SWF is nondictatorial (WD) if it is not dictatorial.
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A SWF which satisfies U, HA and ND is an Arrow social welfare function
(Arrow SWF) over private alternatives.
The second problem is to choose a bundle out of a subset of F,
again as a function of individuals' preferences. Let IT be the set
of all nonempty subsets of F. A n-person social choice correspondence
(SCC) is a correspondence H : ft x n -* H H an n-person SCC
satisfies feasibility (F) if for every B in H and R in ft , H (R,B)
is a subset of B. H satisfies unanimity (U) if for every B in II , R
a profile in ft and X,Y bundles in B, such that for every i in N, x r y ,
J J J
and there exists at least one individual k in N who strictly prefers
x to v —x py, in r, , then bundle Y is not in H (R,B). ri. satisfies
k k k k k
independence of nonoptimal alternatives (INOA) if for every B in
n and every C subset of B, if H
n (R,B) n C * <j>, then H
n (R,C) =
H (R,B) H c. H satisfies uniqueness (UQ) if for every B in II , pro-
file R in ft and X,Y bundles in B, X is in Hn (R,B) implies Y is in
H
n (R,B) if and only if x.iy. in r for every j in N .
H is manipulable if there exist B in II , R,R' profiles in
ft and k an individual in N such that r tv' , for any other j in N
K. K.
(j t k) , r. = r!, and tbere exist X a bundle in H (R 1 ,B) and Y a bundle
in H (R,B), such that x. py in r . If H is not manipulable, it is
tc k k.
said to be nonmanipulable (NM) or s trategy- proof .
H , an n-person SCC is corruptible if there exist b in H , R,R'
profiles in ft and an individual k in N such that r t r', for any
K. rC
other j in N, r. = r!, for some bundles X in H (R,B) and Y in H (R' ,B)
J J
it is x iy, in both r, and r' and Y is not in H (R,B).
k k k k. '
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for any b in II , let B. = |x in A.| there is a bundle (x ,..,x.
,
x,x. x ) in Bl. H is said to be dictatorial (D) if there existsj+1 n '
an individual j in N, such that for any profile R in ft , b in H
and every bundle X in H (R,b), x.r.y for every y in b.. If H is not
J J J
corruptible or not dictatorial it is said to be noncorruptible (NC) and
nondictatorial (ND) respectively. Thus the problem under consideration
here is—can the restricted domains of preferences induced by the no
covet condition, admit Arrow type SWF-s or nondictatorial, strategy
proof choice mechanisms?
2 .2 Results and Discussion
Theorem 1
:
Let ft ' be such that at least one of the restricted domains in it
satisfies the no covet condition, then ft admits:
(i) a SWF h that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant
alternatives and is also nondictatorial, and
(ii) a SCC H that satisfies feasibility, unanimity, uniqueness, and
independence of nonoptimal alternatives and is also nonmanipulable
,
noncorruptible and nondictatorial.
Theorem 1 states that societies in whicn at least part of the mem-
bers adhere to the NC condition can implement strategy proof mechanisms
or Arrow type SWF-s as redistribution mechanisms of the group's wealth
(as represented by the private goods). So strong a statement should
prompt a close scrutiny of the NC condition, its relations to the tenth
commandment and its economic implications.
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Does the NC condition truly represent the tenth commandment?
Clearly the NC property as formulated here is a very restrictive con-
dition on the individual preferences; so too is the tenth commandment
when followed literally. Viewed in this light the NC condition cap-
tures tne essence of the tenth commandment, especially for the cases
where A contains only goods of similar properties and which serve
similar purposes.
However since the NC condition states that every individual prefers
his goods over the other alternatives—does it imply that no trade or
barter economy is possible in societies where all members adhere to the
2
NC condition. It would seem clear that this is not the intent of the
tenth commandment.
The NC condition is stated for situations in which the individual
has to compare only single alternatives to each other; it does not
govern the individual's preferences when sets of alternatives are com-
pared. It may be safely stated that in most barters single goods with
similar properties are not exchanged straight up e.g., (to stay in the
biblical context) not very often are there trades of a goat for a
goat or a horse for a horse without additional side payments! Thus
the NC condition as stated should not retard any trade activity. The
implications of the NC condition for situations in which sets of alter-
natives are compared to each other, are discussed in the next section.
3
Additionally, trades wnich are not Pareto optimal may also take place,
especially in situations where there is a need that doesn't find its
expression in the preference relation. Here we may note that the NC
condition reconciles another difficulty with the RDP approach. Observe
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that nonmanipulable SCC-s are defined here under the assumption that
both the revealed and the true preferences of the individual belong to
the same RDP. This is an assumption made by most researchers in the
field without proper justification. (It was demonstrated that if the
revealed preferences are not restricted, then the restrictions on the
true preferences must be a good deal more strict to allow the deriva-
tion of positive results. See Dulta (1977), Pattanaik. (1978) and
Sengupta and Dulta (1979).) This dilemma doesn't exist here, since it
may be readily ascertained whether or not the revealed preferences of
an individual professing to practice NC actually satisfy the NC con-
dition.
3 . Extending The No Covet Condition
Consider the case in which a set of alternatives can be allocated
to individuals. It was already observed in the previous section that
the NC condition controls only preferences over single items. One may
ask therefore—is the NC condition as stated, enough to guarantee
results similar to those derived in theorem 1 for the new case?
4
Unfortunately, the answer is in the negative. Nevertheless, it is
possible to derive similar results, once the NC condition is extended
to the new case.
To simplify notations we will use whenever possible, the same sym-
bols used in section 2, with tne addition of the on top. Thus for
example let A = {C|C CA and C t $}. Let Z be tne set of all reflexive
transitive and complete binary relations on A, and let R., a nonempty
subset of Z, denote the RDP available to an individual j; a bundle of
•11-
sets of goods is a vector X |x, x \ where x. is an element in A.
l 1 n J 1
Let F = (XJx. n x. = <j> for i t j} be the set of all feasible bundles of
sets of goods etc. ft. a RDP , is said to possess the property of
extended no covet (ENC) if for any preference relation r in ft., every
set of alternatives a in A such that a A. t <j> , and any set of alter-
natives b in A such that b A. = <j>, a is strictly preferred to b in
r—apb in r. With this extended no covet condition, we can prove the
following result.
Theorem 2 :
Let ft be such that at least one of the restricted domains in it
satisfies the extended no covet condition, then ft admits:
(i) a SWF h that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant
alternatives and is also nondictatorial , and
(ii) a SGC H that satisfies feasibility, unanimity, uniqueness and
independence of nonoptimal alternatives and is also nonmanipulable,
noncorruptible and nondictatorial.
Notice that the extended no covet condition is very restrictive and
may lead to extreme situations where' an individual must prefer his
least preferred original alternative to all the other goods (which did
not belong to him originally) combined— too much of a temptation.
Unfortunately less restrictive extensions do not lead to results as
strong as those described in theorem 2.
4 . Summary
The results derived in the previous sections demonstrated that cer-
tain aspects of the Ten Commandments can be considered as attempts to
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restrict the preferences of the individual. These restrictions make it
possiole to implement rational, strategy-proof choice mechanisms, or
alternatively, to create Arrow type social welfare functions over sets
of private alternatives. These results can be viewed as partial valida-
tion of the RDP approach to problems in social choice, since they con-
stitute an empirical example of the creation of an RDP. They also raise
several interesting questions. For example, are there other social
beiiavior or ethical codes which yield similar results? Since the use
of RDP is also widespread in economics, through the utilization of spe-
cial type utility functions, what are the economic implications of the
above results?
Investigation of these and similar questions may help to better
understand some of the prevailing assumptions in the social and behavior
sciences
.
5 . Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
One way to prove this theorem is to use the decomposition con-
ditions developed in Ritz (1983). To make this paper somewhat indepen-
dent of the other, we present a direct proof of the theorem. Without
loss of generality let us assume that £2
1
is a restricted domain of
preferences satisfying the NC condition.
Part (i).
The ordered set of individuals (j . , j . , . • • , j ) is lexicographically
1 Z n
decisive over a set of bundles of alternatives, if for any two bundles
X,Y in the set, the group prefers X to Y iff for some k, 1 <[_ k
_< n,
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individual j. prefers his X alternatives to his Y alternative, while
K.
every individual j , i = l,...,k-l, is indifferent between his alter-
natives (we also say that X is lexicographically preferred to Y by
Let us define a function h : ft A as follows. For any two
bundles of alternatives X,Y in F and any profile R in ft :
if either x or y is in A then the ordered set
(l,2,...,n) is lexicographically decisive over X
and Y, otherwise (namely neither x nor y are in
A.), the ordered set (2,...,n,l) is lexicographically
decisive over X and Y.
Intuitively, in the bundles under consideration, if either of the
alternatives allocated to the first individual originally belonged to
him—he is made the decision maker for the group, otnerwise the second
individual is made the decision maker.
To check that h is well defined is trivial. h satisfies unani-
mity by definition, and since it is defined over pairs of bundles, it
also satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. Since there
are pairs of bundles over which the first individual is decisive and
there are pairs of bundles over which he is not, obviously h is non-
dictatorial. Thus it is only left to prove that h is a SWF, namely it
is a complete, reflexive and transitive relation on F. That it is
complete and reflexive is a straightforward proof. Transitivity:
assume there exists X,Y,Z bundles of alternatives in F and a profile
R in ft such that Xh
n
(R) Yh
n (R)Zhn (R)X, and without loss of generality
assume it is XPY in h
n
(R). Case 1: x is in A . Then Zh (R)X implies
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z is in A (if not, by the NC condition x pz in r and tnerefore
XPZ in n
n (R)) and z r x , Yh U)Z implies y in A^ and y_L r i z 1 » and XPY
implies x r y.. Therefore it must be x iy.iz in r . but then, XPY
implies that for some 2 < k < n, it is x.iy. in r. for i = 2,...,k-l
- - J J J
and x py, in r . Suppose it is also YPZ in h (R), then there exists
individual 1 , 2 <_ I <_ n such that for every j = 2, ... ,1-1, it is
x iy. in r., and x py in r . If I < k, then it implies x pz in r
2 2 J * * *
— III
while x.iy. in r. for i = 2,. .
.
,1-1. Therefore by definition XPZ in
J J J
h (R), a contradiction. So it must be I > k, but then it is x,py,iz
in r, and x.iy iz . for i = 2,...,k-l, and again by definition it must
k J J J
be XPZ in h (R), a contradiction. Thus it must be YIZ in h (R) which
implies y.iz. for j l,...,n, but then it is x^py.iz in r, , and
therefore by definition XPZ in h (R), a contradiction. Case 2: x
1
is
not an element of A . Then XPY implies y is not in A (because of the
NC condition) and therefore Yh (R)Z implies that z is not in A . A
contradiction is then reached by the same reasoning as in the last part
of case 1.
Part (ii).
For any set B of alternatives, subset of F, and any profile R in
ft , define H a SCC as follows:
H
n (R,B) = {X in 6 | for no Y in b, it is YPX in h"(R)}
(hn (R) is tne SWF defined in part (i) of the proof). That Hn is a SCC
that satisfies the unanimity, uniqueness and independence of nonoptimal
alternatives conditions, and is also nonmanipulable , noncorruptible and
nondictatorial is an immediate result of theorem 3 in Ritz (1983).
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Proof of Theorem 2 :
Part 1 : Without loss of generality let us assume tnat ft satisfies the
£NC condition. Let us define a function h : Q * A as follows.
For any two bundles of sets of alternatives X and Y in F, and any pro-
file R in il : if x is such that x n A * <$> or y is such that
y H A * $ then the ordered set (l,2,...,n) is lexicographically deci-
sive over X and Y, otherwise the ordered set (2,...,n,l) is lexi-
cographically decisive over X and Y. The proof that h is an Arrow
type SWF follows exactly the steps described in the proof of theorem 1
and is not repeated here.
Part 2:
For any profile R in 0, and any subset B of F define h a SCC
as follows:
H
n (R,B) = {X in B j for no Y in B, it is YPX in hn (R)}
n,
(h (R) is the SWF defined in part 1 of the proof). Again, the same
reasoning used in the proof of theorem 1 applies here and is not
repeated.
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Kh.MARKS
1. >lanipulabili ty (and nonmani pulability ) can be defined in a number
of different ways for social choice correspondences. Fortunately,
the different definitions coincide when the SCC also satisfies U,
Ug and INOA (see Ritz (1983, 1985)).
2. This question was raised by Elon Kohlberg.
3. This observation is due to Robert Aumann.
4. The proof of this claim is not brought here since it relies heavily
on results derived in Ritz (1983) and will necessitate the intro-
duction of many new notations and definitions.
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